Outer anti-speciesism

 Recently there is much talk about anti-speciesism and many begin to define themselves by this term, so that it is not uncommon to meet it among political preferences, or even religious, in the profiles of the users of social networks.

It seems to me that such a definition is not only limiting the person, but also ideas and, ultimately, the world that one intend to build.

Being “anti” something should, by definition, relate to the inclination and thought only in relation to that particular phenomenon: one can, for example, take a stand on racism professing to be anti-racist, or about sexism, such as anti-sexist.

But can one orientate himself exclusively (or mainly) to  the existence of a phenomenon that aims to fight? The most perverse effect is to bind to it and, therefore, lose any raison d’etre once that it has been defeated.

In addition, promoting a critical moment, without any organic is equivalent to lean against a wall that you are trying to demolish: once succeeded you will be on the ground with it, not having raised any other in the meantime.

From the theoretical to the practical, the exaltation of the opposition is probably the most immediate and satisfying, but hardly lead to the best result, not counting the additional perverse effect inherent in this: every time you promote your ideal, you mention – so promoting – also the antithetical ideal, on the one hand, perpetuating, secondly recognizing importance and, finally, having to always measure with it.

If you start with a model that considers inappropriate from the ground up, there is no reason to propose a model related, even in opposite: we must simply think of one new and different, not linked whatsoever.

In anti-speciesism definition you end up in a sort of paradox, since it is impossible to live in the modern world (but also in ancient times), treating (or considering) exactly the same way all species, so while the base current of thought inevitably raises a distinction between the kingdom of animals, vegetables and minerals, which leads to consider only the members of the first.

Even among the animal species nobody can seriously claim to renounce any form of discrimination, since – unlike – people should consider entirely comparable to kill by car a gnat to a human being, or a dog. In this sense, the justification consists in affirming that the order of importance of the “animals” than in the “bugs” is far different, as well as pain perception, cognition, etc. In short, you end up simply to move the dissertation by comparing “human – non-human” to the “animals – insects”.

This, of course, without considering the issues of the vegetable kingdom, often dismissed lightly, “the plants do not suffer” or “plants do not scream” (and both assertions are contradicted by science).

In fact it is clear that there are many differences between the species, and that human life does not allow to really consider tamquam not essent, without, in fact, operate on the basis of distinctions that end up being arbitrary and subjective .

The solution is not to deny some diversities, only to affirm others, nor to establish boundaries under which feel morally intact whatever we do; we should rather strive to foster a world and a culture where respect is not the result of arbitrary choices, more or less wise, but a fact intrinsic and recognizable to anyone and anything, in the manner and degree as wide as possible, according to the principle of equilibrium.

Coining the term “speciesism” , however, attributed a dignity and recognition to conduct which, in hindsight, is probably not deliberate, nor heard or rationalized though it is still a discrimination has nothing to do with behaviors such as racism or sexism, which not coincidentally are the exclusive prerogative of the human species . The “speciesism” is innate in any animal, pursuing the interests of their own species, placing those before others: in this sense the problem of human beings is not the fact of worry eminently of the “most similar”, but rather to exploit all those that are not deemed such, and, above all, to do it for pleasure or self-interest and without any need.

I personally think that on ethical level even the “relativsism” (as we might call discrimination against persons who gives more importance to their own relatives than to non-relatives ) is not justified, but the difference between personal inclination and duty lies in the rights of others: as long as an individual choice tends to privilege someone, not hurting others unjustly, it is a free choice. The moment you decide to prefer anyone to anyone else, causing damage to the latter, it overflows from freedom of choice and leads to arbitrariness.

The Eusebist proposition is simple: to affirm respect and balance to the maximum extent possible and outside the observer’s perspective, designing a world in which you can recognize all the differences, but not discriminate on the basis thereof, and where once that those walls that one try to demolish are collapsed, do not end up together with them in the ground, but remain standing balanced into a new world, without the need for walls.